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Sensation of movement 
 
An introduction 
Thor Grünbaum and Mark Schram Christensen 
This book is about the sensation of movement and the role of these sensations in motor control, sense of 
agency, and bodily self-recognition. Sensations of movement are the conscious impressions of bodily 
movement that a person normally has when she moves her body (for instance, when she is walking) or a part 
of her body (for instance, raising her arm). Movements of a person’s body or a part of her body come in both 
active and passive varieties. As we shall see, it is an open question whether the sensations of movement 
should also be divided into active and passive types. In certain situations, the sensations of movement might 
be sufficient to make a person believe that her body is moving (for instance, a vibrator applied to the tendon 
of the tibialis anterior muscle of a relaxed seated person can give her an illusory sensation of plantar flexion 
of the foot, see Roll & Vedel, 1982). It might even be possible to create the sensory impression of active 
movement. Studies using direct electrical cortical stimulation during surgery (Desmurget et al., 2009; Fried 
et al., 1991) indicate that participants can experience an urge to move related directly to sensations of 
movement. These latter results remain contentious. One reason for being skeptical about the existence of 
“active movement sensations” is the fact that it is unclear what kinds of information give rise to the sensations 
in question. Afferent information from muscles, tendons, and skin plays obvious roles. But what about motor 
commands and predicted afferent feedback computed from the commands? And how do these various 
sources of information interact in cases of informational consistency and conflict? 
The sensations normally associated with movements have for a long time been of central interest in the 
domains of modelling-based approaches to motor control, psychology of bodily self-recognition, and 
philosophy of action. Although there is consensus that moving agents have sensations of movement, and that 
these sensations play important roles in movement control and cognition, there is little agreement about 
what these roles are and how sensations play these roles. The present volume is motivated by this lack of 
agreement in the cognitive sciences and philosophy. Our aim with the present volume is not to settle these 
disagreements once and for all, but to highlight some of the sources for the missing consensus and provide 
some of the groundwork for further progress. We do this by addressing three fundamental aspects: (1) The 
content of conscious sensations of movement, (2) experimental designs and measures, and (3) the possible 
functions of proprioceptive and kinaesthetic information in motor control and bodily cognition. 
Models and theories of the role of sensations of movement in motor control and self-attribution of action 
and body are characterized by a tension between, on the one hand, the seemingly innocuous intuition that 
sensations of movement are important to motor control and bodily self-recognition and, on the other hand, 
striking experimental results and theoretical considerations that raise doubts about this intuition. Let us 
elaborate this point. On the one hand, it feels like something to move one’s body, and it seems as if these 
sensations are important for the normal performance of controlled movements, self-attribution of actions, 
and bodily self-recognition. This importance can be inferred from cases where the normal sensations of 
movement are absent or somehow diminished. On the other hand, well confirmed experimental results (e.g. 
Longo & Haggard, 2010, 2012) and weighty theoretical considerations challenge this inference (for 
discussion, see Wong, Present volume, chapter 7). Given these results and considerations, it is no longer clear 
that the conscious movement sensations could play these significant roles. In this brief introduction, we will 
articulate this tension and place the various chapters of this volume with respect to it. 
It is a strong intuition that normal functioning of motor control and self-recognition relies on conscious 
sensations of movement. Let us here mention three types of evidence that seem to justify this intuition. First, 
cases of deafferentation indicate that motor functions suffer dramatically when agents are no longer able to 
feel their bodily movements. This is famously demonstrated by the case of IW (see Cole, 1995). As a young 
man, IW lost all sensation of movement from his neck and down. At first, he lost his ability to control his 
movements, even though he had suffered no damage to his efferent motor system. Although he never 
recovered his sensation of movement, through hard and extensive practice, he slowly regained some abilities 
to control his movements. Importantly, IW’s motor control abilities appear to be qualitatively different from 
Final draft. Please refer to published version: Grünbaum, T., & Christensen, M. S. (Eds.) (2017). 
Sensation of Movement. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Current Issues in Consciousness Research). 
2 
 
normal motor control (for a careful discussion of deafferentation, see Wong, Present volume, chapter 7). Thus, 
losing the sensation of movement seriously alters abilities to control one’s movements. 
Second, damage to brain structures involved in control of movement and sensation of movement can give 
rise to striking alterations of self-attribution of action and body parts. Some patients, suffering from complete 
contralesional hemiplegia, deny their brain damage and claim to have intact motor abilities (anosognosia for 
hemiplegia). It has recently been proposed that this phenomenon could be explained by patients having 
illusory sensations of movement produced by a malfunctioning motor control system (Berti & Pia, 2006). 
Thus, non-veridical sensations of movement might produce self-attribution of action in patients that are 
unable to move. 
Third, certain psychopathological delusions have been linked to altered motor awareness and altered self-
recognition (e.g. Frith, 2005). This has been the general framework for one popular way of explaining 
delusions of alien control in patients with schizophrenia. According to this type of explanation, delusions of 
alien control can occur when the patient’s sensation of voluntary movement are somehow indistinguishable 
from sensations of passive movements. A certain sense of agency is missing. Consequently, the patient can 
come to believe that her movements are controlled by some alien force. Pathological changes to the 
sensations of movement are thus thought to be involved in the misattribution of agency. 
A natural conclusion to cases such as these is that sensations of movement play important roles in normal 
motor control, sense of agency, and bodily self-recognition. However, when we try to articulate what exactly 
these roles might be, problems start to occur. Here we will briefly discuss three types of considerations that 
raise doubt about the acceptability of the intuition that sensations have important functional roles in 
movement control, sense of agency, and bodily self-recognition. This sets the scene for the chapters of the 
present volume. 
First, it is unclear how we should describe the content of the experience in question. What is the content 
of the sensations of movement? One way to understand the notion of content is by imagining a situation 
where all “naturally occurring” sources of sensory information are screened off. Suppose that in this state we 
can artificially induce in a person (say, by vibrating tendons or by direct cortical stimulation) the types of 
information sufficient for creating the subjective illusion of bodily movement. If the person is ignorant of the 
artificial situation, would these artificially induced streams of information suffice to make her believe that 
she is moving a specific body part? If they do suffice, that would be a good reason to describe the sensations 
as representing a particular kind of movement, say, a movement of her right foot. In the same way, we can ask 
whether the sensations represent the movement as being active or passive. 
In contemporary cognitive neuroscience, the issue is often phrased in terms of the distinction between 
sense of ownership and sense of agency (see Gallagher, 2000). According to this distinction, bodily 
movements are always experienced with a sense of ownership irrespective of whether they are passive or 
active. In addition to the ownership experience, active movements are also experienced with a sense of 
agency. We can now ask whether the sense of agency is part of the sensory content related to the movement 
or a higher cognitive construct (or both – maybe there is a low-level “actish feel” built into the sensations of 
active movements as well as a higher-level sense of agency related to planning and decision-making). As long 
as we do not have a clear grasp of how to describe the content of the sensations of movement, it is hard to 
know whether sensations could play important explanatory roles in motor control and sense of agency. 
The first two chapters address important questions about the content of the sensations of movement. In 
chapter 1, Andreas Kalckert takes a closer look at the distinction between sense of ownership and sense of 
agency. This distinction has been important in conceptualising results from “rubber hand” experiments. The 
standard paradigm uses a static motionless setup. The chapter investigates whether we can manipulate sense 
of ownership and sense of agency in versions of the paradigm where participants are moving. In chapter 2, 
Myrto Mylopoulos argues that bodily sensations of movement can represent the movement as active. 
According to Myrto Mylopoulos, this question is parallel to questions about the nature of the content of visual 
perception. Some people defend a sparse view according to which vision can only represent visual features 
such as shape, orientation, and colour, whereas other people defend a rich view according to which vision 
can also represent categories such as “chairness” or “elephantness”. Similarly, according to a sparse view of 
sensations of movement, the sensations represent only kinematic features; by contrast, according to a rich 
view, the sensations represent also “jerkyness”, “smoothness”, “activity”, and “passivity”. 
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Second, it is unclear how to experimentally measure and manipulate these sensations and their supposed 
“activity” feature. How can we be certain that sensations of movement play important roles for control and 
recognition if we have no good way of measuring and manipulating them? It is possible that it is not by virtue 
of being conscious that certain types of sensory information are important to movement control. 
Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the sense of agency that is supposed to play a role in action 
attribution is reducible to higher-level cognitive processes such as conscious planning, deliberation, and 
decision-making (for discussion, see Grünbaum, 2015; Mylopoulos, 2015). 
Chapters 3 and 4 take up these important methodological questions. In chapter 3, Mads Jensen, Mia Dong, 
Mikkel C. Vinding and Morten Overgaard address the issue of how to measure the sense of agency. They 
review the most important measures in the experimental literature. Importantly, they also present some of 
the early results of their work on developing a subjective scale of sense of control. In chapter 4, Mark Schram 
Christensen and Thor Grünbaum raise another methodological problem for the experimental sense of agency 
literature. By reviewing the dominant experimental paradigms, they show that most existing studies 
investigate ways in which agents bring about effects in the immediate environment. Dominant paradigms are 
therefore not suited for investigating the sense of agency related directly to bodily movements. The existing 
literature in cognitive neuroscience can therefore not be used to say anything substantial about whether or 
not sensations of movement represent the activity of the movement. 
Third, it is unclear that proprioceptive information has the required precision to play a central role in motor 
control. It seems intuitively correct that one type of proprioceptive information important for control of 
movements is information about the position of the body parts. In a series of experiments, Longo and Haggard 
(e.g. Longo & Haggard, 2010, 2012) have demonstrated that this information is subject to systematic 
distortions. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated how easily this information can be manipulated and how 
prone we are to experience various kinds of body illusions (see, for instance, Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014). If 
these results do not directly undermine the intuition that sensations of movement have important motor 
control functions, they do at least seriously qualify the possible roles these sensations could play. 
The last group of chapters attends directly to these questions. In chapter 5, Anne Kavounoudias reviews 
experimental literature studying the various sources of information involved in sensations of movement. A 
plurality of sensory modalities is involved in generating sensations of movement. This plurality of sensory 
streams can give rise to various kinds of informational redundancies and conflicts. By drawing on 
physiological, neuroscientific, and psychophysical research, Anne Kavounoudias argues for a Bayesian model 
of the sensation of movement as a kind of multimodal perception based on cross-modal interactions rather 
than an a-modal perception as previously suggested by James Gibson in the 1960s. In chapter 6, Matthew R. 
Longo reviews research on distorted body representations underlying position sense. Recent research has 
revealed that both tactile size perception and position sense rely on highly distorted representations of the 
body. The presence of such distortions raises a fundamental problem. The lack of proprioceptive afferent 
information is known to cause devastating impairments in skilled action, suggesting that position sense plays 
a critical role in skilled action. Mathew R. Longo sketches an answer to the basic question of how skilled action 
can co-exist with distorted representations of the body. In the final chapter 7, Hong Yu Wong systematically 
articulates this basic conflict. According to Hong Yu Wong, we cannot respond to this conflict by discarding 
proprioception from motor control because we know from the severe problems deafferented agents face in 
acting that ordinary action requires proprioception. The solution, he proposes, is that the possibility of bodily 
action is provided for by multimodal body representations for action. Hong Yu Wong’s proposal is supported 
by the kind of Bayesian model proposed by Anne Kavounoudias. 
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